We examine the role of internal and external certification mechanisms in the issuance choice of SEOs between accelerated offers and fully marketed offers. Our empirical work supports the view that a firm's internal corporate governance structure and audit fee are associated with the issuance choice between accelerated and fully marketed offers. Furthermore, we find that after controlling for the self-selection problem, firms paying higher audit fee incur lower flotation costs as measured by gross spreads. Finally, we find a significant positive association between audit fee and the net proceeds raised in SEOs.
Introduction
In their seminal work, Myers and Majluf (1984) However, asymmetric information is always an issue and investment bankers conduct due diligence before underwriting an issue to mitigate the problem. During the last 15 years, accelerated bookbuilt offers have become a popular method for issuing seasoned equity offerings (SEOs).
1 Accelerated offers are typically completed in one day compared to 31 days between filing to offer for fully marketed offers. This raises the question of how issuing firms deal with asymmetric information while using accelerated offers method for issuing SEOs. We address this issue by examining the role of certification in reducing the information asymmetry in the context of issuance choice between accelerated offerings and fully marketed SEOs.
Gao and Ritter (2010) examine the choice between accelerated and fully marketed SEOs.
They also report that fully marketed offers pay higher average gross spreads than accelerated offers. Furthermore, fully marketed offers are more underpriced compared to accelerated offers. 2 Overall, fully marketed offers take longer to issue and incur higher transaction costs. This raises the question as to why firms use the slower and more expensive method of issuing fully marketed SEOs. Gao and Ritter (2010) posit that that firms use fully marketed issues when faced with relatively more inelastic demand curve for their stocks. Autore et al. (2011) suggest that lower quality issuers prefer accelerated offerings to avoid rigorous pre-issue scrutiny by 1 Gao and Ritter (2010) 2 However, accelerated offers have slightly larger discount and experience slightly more negative stock price reaction than fully marketed offers.
5 take a more lenient view of due diligence standards for accelerated offerings compared to fully marketed offers (Morgenson, 2004) .
How do investment bankers cope with the challenge of time pressures in conducting due diligence of accelerated offerings? What can issuing firm managers do to mitigate the difficulties faced by investment bankers? There is as yet no work on this issue. We contribute to the literature by examining the importance of potential alternate certification mechanisms that firms can use in the context of accelerated SEOs.
We suggest that firms can potentially use an internal certification mechanism such as their corporate governance structure to diminish the role of due diligence activities performed by investment bankers. We construct a firm's internal corporate governance score using raw data on a firm's reported corporate governance practices and use this as our proxy of internal certification quality. We posit that firms with better quality internal governance are more likely to choose accelerated offerings while making SEOs.
We also propose that firms can use external certification mechanisms such as the purchase of high quality audit services to mitigate the importance of due diligence investigations by underwriters. We postulate that firms may use audit fee as an external certification mechanism to reduce the information asymmetry between managers of issuing firms and potential investors with investment bankers mediating between them. We therefore suggest that firms which pay higher audit fees are more likely to choose accelerated offerings while making SEOs.
Our empirical work suggests that these internal and external certification mechanisms perform three significant roles in the issuance of SEOs. First, by reducing information asymmetry, certification mechanisms influence the choice between accelerated offerings and 6 fully marketed offers. Second, we find that certification mechanisms help to reduce the issuance costs as measured by gross spread. Finally, we find that there is an association between the efficacy of certification and the net proceeds of SEO issuance.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we provide the theoretical underpinnings for our empirical tests and develop the hypotheses. In section 3, we describe the data sources, our sample selection procedures, and the characteristics of our sample.
In section 4, we report our empirical results, discuss the implications, and report results from robustness checks. Our concluding comments are offered in section 5.
Theoretical Underpinnings

Shelf Registration and Underwriter Certification
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) adopted Rule 415, also known as shelf registration, which allowed large firms to register the total amount of securities it wishes to sell over the subsequent two year period and sell portions of them whenever it chooses. This rule became effective from November 1983. The SEC stipulated that companies that wish to register their offerings under Rule 415 must satisfy the following conditions: (i) the aggregate market value of the firm's outstanding shares and unaffiliated voting stock should be greater than $150 million; (ii) the firm should not have defaulted on its preferred stock, debt, or rental obligations in the last three years; (iii) the firm should have met all the disclosure requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 during the last three years; and (iv) the firm's bonds should have investment grade rating.
Some researchers (see Bhagat et al., 1985; Kadapakkam and Kon, 1989 among others) argue that shelf offerings hold several benefits for issuing firms. First, Bhagat et al. (1985) contend that shelf offerings enable the issuer to time the offering dates to take advantage of 7 favourable market conditions. By aligning the issuance with demand for its shares, issuers would be able to sell their equity at better prices. Second, the shelf offering process may intensify competition between underwriters thereby lowering the issuance costs. Finally, shelf offerings may lower the fixed costs associated with the SEC registration. Under traditional registration process, there are large fixed cost components due to the SEC registration requirements. With a shelf registration, the fixed costs of an offering are substantially reduced since it does not require the preparation or distribution of detailed prospectuses. Empirical evidence supporting the view that issuance costs are lower for shelf offerings is provided by Bhagat et al. (1985) and more recently by Autore et al. (2008) .
Investors interested in purchasing newly issued equity securities face an adverse selection problem since managers have privileged access to information that outsiders do not have.
Therefore managers have incentives to issue new shares when the market overvalues them.
Typically, the market price of shares falls when a firm announces a new seasoned equity issue.
In this context, underwriters provide a valuable service by certifying the validity of the current market price. Underwriters have incentives to correctly price each issue in order to preserve their reputation.
Shelf registration exacerbates the information asymmetry problem faced by investors.
When a firm utilizes Rule 415, it is not obligated to appoint an underwriter until the date of offering. In reality, once a shelf registration has been filed, investment bankers make competitive bids for the issue. Investment bankers have incentives to charge lower fees in order to win the bid while facing two impediments in performing their due diligence investigations. First, since there is no guarantee that a given investment banking firm will be chosen to underwrite the offering, it has no incentives to incur the costs of investigating the firm. Second, the investment banker will 8 have little time to conduct the due diligence investigation. This is because oftentimes an underwriter is chosen on the same day that the offering is completed. Denis (1991) attributes impediments to underwriter certification as the major factor behind the steep decline in shelf offerings of industrial firms during the years 1984-1988.
However, more recently, Autore et al. (2008) document a resurgence in shelf offerings during 1990-2003. They acknowledge the difficulties faced by investment bankers in conducting due diligence of firms that use shelf registration. They suggest that firms that use shelf registration mitigate the under-certification problem by using shelf offerings during periods when there is less need for underwriter certification. These include periods following low abnormal stock price runups, and after prior certification in previous seasoned offerings.
Accelerated Offers
Shelf offerings may be further classified into accelerated and traditional bookbuilt offers based on the speed of issuance. Accelerated offerings may be completed quickly. There are two types of accelerated offers -bought deals and accelerated bookbuilt offers. In a bought deal, the issuing firm announces the amount of stock it wishes to sell and underwriters bid for these shares. The underwriter that offers the highest net price wins the deal. The winning underwriter typically resells the shares to institutional investors within the following 24 hours. Essentially, bought deals are auctions to underwriters followed by open market sales. In accelerated bookbuilt offers, investment banks submit proposals specifying a gross spread, but not necessarily the offer price, for the right to underwrite the shares. The winning bank then forms a syndicate and markets the shares to institutional investors.
Gao and Ritter (2010) examine the factors that determine issuing firms' choice of using accelerated offerings versus traditional fully marketed offerings. They find that accelerated 9 bookbuilt offerings are typically completed in a single day while fully marketed SEOs take, on average, 31 days to complete. Also, accelerated offers have lower gross spreads than fully marketed offers. Accelerated offers further have lower underpricing compared to fully marketed offers.
From the underwriter's point of view, in an accelerated offer, there is no time to conduct an accurate due diligence analysis. Typically, there is far less information gathering and marketing effort required from underwriters for accelerated offers. In order to win the deal in a timely manner, the underwriter must quickly assess the market demand before committing an offer price. Thus, only the largest and most capital intensive underwriters conduct accelerated offers. The underwriting syndicates are smaller, take much more risk and generate comparable revenues over shorter periods and effectively "buy" market share and league table rankings. For the underwriters, insufficient due diligence raises the possibility of increased legal liabilities.
For example, in the case of WorldCom, which conducted two speedy shelf offers, investors sued underwriters for negligence and were paid over $6 billion in settlement. (Schor, 2006) Taken together, it appears that issuing firms will benefit significantly from using accelerated offers rather than fully marketed offers. This raises an important issue. If accelerated offers are highly beneficial compared to fully marketed offers, then why do issuing firms continue to use the slower and more expensive method of issuing SEOs? Gao and Ritter (2010) find evidence consistent with the view that issuing firms that have a more inelastic demand curve for its shares tend to use fully marketed offers. Also firms making larger size issues use a fully marketed offer.
Certification Mechanisms
In this paper, we utilize two certification mechanisms. First, we score a firm's internal corporate governance features and consider this as an internal certification device. Second, we use audit fee paid by the firm as the second certification mechanism. The audit fee paid by a frim can be considered as an external certification mechanism.
Internal Corporate Governance
Prior literature on the impact of a firm's internal corporate governance on its valuation, Corporate governance features may also improve operational transparency by increasing the ability of shareholders to discern the quality of management and the actual value of the firm.
Governance provisions strengthen the disciplinary threat of removing the management and therefore limit the extent to which management can expropriate firm value through shirking, empire building, overconsumption of perquisites, and risk aversion. 8 Summing up, prior literature provides abundant evidence that a firm's internal corporate governance improves the information environment of a firm and thereby reduces the information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders.
Audit Fee
Both policy makers and academicians believe that the audit fee paid by a firm is positively associated with the quality of financial reporting. Empirical evidence in support of the view that lower audit fees are associated with lower audit quality is provided by Blankley et al. (2012) who found that auditors of restatement firms charge lower fees in the years prior to the announcement of restatements. Ball et al. (2012) posit that managers seeking to disseminate private information need a mechanism for credibly committing to be truthful. They propose that committing to the provision of high quality audited financial statements is a potentially effective mechanism. Therefore, they use the amount of excess audit fees paid by a firm as the proxy for the level of its financial statement verification. They consider that audit service is a differentiated product that permits clients to choose their auditor and several aspects of audit quality and effort.
Furthermore, audit fees are affected by the choice of audit firm (Big 4 versus others), the level of seniority of the audit engagement partner, the number and hourly rate of audit personnel deployed for the job, the degree of verification sought by the firm, and the frequency of communication with the audit committee and other key executives. Audit fees are directly linked to the level and price of audit activity and therefore to the degree of independent verification of financial reporting. 
Hypotheses Issuance Choice
We argue that a firm's internal corporate governance arrangement could serve as a potential certification device. Thus firms with high quality internal governance mechanisms may 13 reduce the extent of due diligence performed by underwriters. Given the benefits of shelf offerings as compared to non-shelf offerings, good governance firms will choose shelf offerings over non-shelf offerings. Given our arguments in the previous subsection, we postulate that the audit fee paid by a firm will serve as an external certification mechanism. We thus posit the following hypothesis:
H1: Firms with better certification quality are more likely to choose shelf offerings while making SEOs, other things being equal.
Given the risky nature of the accelerated offer method, it makes sense for underwriters to use a certification device before accepting a deal. We suggest that firms may use their internal corporate governance structure and/or audit fee as a potential certification device. In order to protect their reputation and lower their risk, investment bankers will prefer to underwrite offers made by high quality firms that certify their quality through internal corporate governance structure and / or audit fee. Thus we posit:
H2: Firms with better certification quality are more likely to choose accelerated offerings while making SEO, other things being equal.
Flotation Costs
A key variable of interest is flotation cost. When underwriters bid for an SEO issue, they are compensated for their risk-bearing and marketing services. Underwriters typically buy an SEO from the issuers at an offer price discount which is their compensation. In investment banking parlance, this compensation is called the gross spread. The main components of gross spread are a) management fee, b) underwriting fee and c) selling concession (see, Lee and Masulis 2009 ). Typically, gross spread is scaled by offer price and expressed as a percentage.
Since gross spread includes a compensation for risk, it stands to reason that less risky firms 14 would have lower gross spreads. Also, a firm's internal corporate governance setup is an indicator of agency risks faced by the underwriter. Thus well-governed firms are expected to pay lower gross spreads as compared to poorly governed firms. Audit fee is an external certification device and firms paying higher audit fee are purchasing higher quality verification and authentication services to ensure their financial reporting quality. We therefore expect that firms paying higher audit fee will enjoy lower flotation costs as investment bankers are likely to be cognizant of this aspect of a firm while conducting its SEO. We thus posit:
H3: Firms with better certification quality will have lower gross spreads while making SEOs, other things being equal.
Net Proceeds
The net proceeds of an offer (offer size) could potentially be affected by asymmetric information. Following the arguments of Myers and Majluf (1984) , greater information asymmetry increases the incentives of mangers to time equity offerings when their stock is overvalued. This could lead to a negative relation between corporate governance quality and issue proceeds. Alternately, underwriters could be reluctant to manage large issues of firms with poor quality. This could lead to a positive relation between the quality of certification (internal corporate governance or audit fee) and issue size. We prefer the second position as investment bankers would recognise the risk to their reputation and would be cautious when they suspect that the firm is overvalued or is of lower quality. We therefore posit:
H4: Firms with better certification quality will raise larger net proceeds while making SEOs, other things being equal.
Data, Sample, and Measures of Governance Quality
Data and Sample Selection
In this paper, we rely on four sources of data. 13 We use these three samples to run regressions that examine the determinants of issue methods and flotation costs. For the sake of brevity and exposition, we rely on the largest sample, the shelf offers sample, to describe sample summary statistics (Table 1) , correlations between key variables of interest (Table 2) , and univariate analysis (Table  3) .
ISS compiles fifty-five governance attributes for each firm. A firm's performance on each attribute is determined by examining its regulatory filings, website and annual reports. Firms do not pay to get rated but are allowed to access their ratings and verify the accuracy of ratings.
Firms can only change their ratings by altering the governance structure and publicly disclosing it. ISS scores each firm on each attribute depending on whether it meets a threshold level of acceptability. The fifty five attributes cover four broad categories: board composition and effectiveness, anti-takeover provisions, compensation and ownership, and audit practices. The rating provided by ISS (that is, IndustryCGQ) evaluates the strength, deficiencies, and overall quality of a company's corporate governance practices and is designed on the premise that good corporate governance ultimately results in increased shareholder value. The exact weighting of the different features of governance in computing the index is not available to us.
Also, ISS claims that CGQ is a "reliable tool for identifying portfolio risk related to governance and leverages governance to drive increased shareholder value". However, in addition to the index scores provided by ISS, we also construct our own index using the raw data provided to us 18 by RiskMetrics. A clear benefit of constructing our own governance indicator is that we are able to capture a wide variety of governance features employed by firms.
We create our own governance rating based on the raw data provided by ISS. The overall score (CGI4) is the sum of the ratings for the four categories of governance practices mentioned above. The first corporate governance rating, G1, represents board composition and effectiveness. G2 is the rating that measures anti-takeover defences. G3 is the governance score that measures managerial compensation and incentives. G4 is the rating that measures the strength of audit practices. We score each firm based on whether or not it meets the threshold of good governance for each attribute. Based on this binary coding of each attribute, we first compute the G1, G2, G3, and G4 scores and then aggregate them to arrive at the overall score for each firm, CGI4. In our study, we use G1, G2, G3, and G4 to pinpoint the specific governance mechanisms that are at work. We also use CGI4, and IndustryCGQ, as proxies for the overall governance quality.
External Certification
We argue that the certification of an issuer's quality should be made by players in the equity issue process, that is, by the issue firm (self-certification), or its underwriters, auditors, or potential investors interested in the shares issued. Based on this reasoning, we use natural logarithm of a firm's total audit fee as a proxy for the certification from its auditors based on the premise that higher audit fee indicates more effort and work done by the auditors and hence 19 stronger certification. 14 Following Coulton et al. (2012), we use three-year average audit fees to proxy for external certification. 4.3% of the total proceeds. Our four governance components ratings (G1 to G4) are all scaled to have a maximum possible rating of 0.25, and hence the highest possible value for the overall rating CGI4 is 1. IndustryCGQ, as discussed before, is the percentile ranking assigned by RiskMetrics, and therefore have the maximum value of 100. Table 1 indicates that both our four governance components ratings (G1 to G4) and the two overall governance ratings (CGI4, IndustryCGQ) show a fair amount of variation across the sample firms.
Sample Characteristics
In addition to the frequency of issue methods, issue costs, and governance quality, we also provide other firm and issue characteristics that we think may affect firms' choice of issue methods and their respective costs. In terms of firm characteristics, an average sample firm has net sales (used as a proxy for firm size) of US $1.35 billion. A median sample firm generates about 5% earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) from its total assets, experiences around 18%
14 Another proxy is the identity of the auditor, e.g., whether the auditor is one of the Big 5 accounting firms. However, only less than 8% of our observations do not have a Big-5 auditor. We therefore do not include it in the regressions. 15 The portion of accelerated offers in our sample is comparable to that in Gao and Ritter (2010) 
Empirical Results
Preliminary Results
In order to obtain a preliminary understanding between the relation between the quality of the firm corporate governance and the decision to issue SEO using shelf/ accelerated methods, we calculate the correlation coefficients between dummy variables for shelf and accelerated, gross spread and several proxies for governance quality ratings. We present the coefficients and the p-values for the test of significance in Table 2 . The table shows that the choice of shelf offer and the choice of accelerated offer are both positively correlated with all the governance quality ratings except for G2 (anti-takeover). Further, the issue costs, as measured by gross spread, are negatively correlated with all the governance quality ratings except for G2. All the reported correlations are highly statistically significant. These findings are generally consistent with our hypotheses that firms with better governance quality are more likely to use shelf-registered or accelerated offers, and they enjoy lower financing costs. The only exception being the correlation between G2 (the anti-takeover measure) and issue methods and issue costs that do not show the expected sign. Another key finding reported in Table 2 is that issue costs are significantly negatively correlated with shelf and accelerated offers. This is consistent with Bhagat et al. (1985) , who find that stocks sold through shelf offerings incur lower issue costs than those sold through regular (non-shelf) offerings. Ours results are also consistent with Gao 16 We focus on the medians for accounting measures, because they are less affected by outliers.
21
and Ritter (2010) who report untabulated results indicating that gross spreads are lower for firms making accelerated offers.
We then take a step further by utilizing our panel data and sorting all sample issues into quintiles by our overall governance rating, CGI4. We examine the choice of issue methods, issue costs, and other important firm and issue characteristics for each of the 5 portfolios (quintiles) and report our results in Table 3 . Panel A shows that as we move from Quintile 1, which contains firms with the lowest governance quality, to Quintile 5, which contains firms with the highest governance quality, there is a strict monotonicity in the frequency of shelf offers and accelerated offers, as well as in the magnitude of issue costs. For instance, only 25.6% of firms in the lowest governance quality quintile use accelerated offers increasing to 51.7% of firms in the highest governance quality quintile. These findings provide initial support for hypothesis H2. Except for firm size, which increases with governance quality, all the other firm and issue characteristics do not show any clearly discernible patterns across governance quintiles.
We then formally test the significance of the monotonicity found in Panel A of Table 3 .
In Panel B of Table 3 , we calculate the difference in the frequency of shelf and accelerate offers and in the issue costs between every 2 consecutive governance quintiles, and test the significance of the differences. Panel B shows that all the differences in the frequency of shelf offers across consecutive governance quintiles are statistically and economically significant. For example, approximately 13% more equity issues are offered through shelf registration when we compare Quintile 4 with Quintile 3. The differences in the frequency of accelerated offers demonstrate very similar pattern, though the increase in the use of accelerated offering from Quintile 4 to Quintile 5 firms is not statistically significant. As for the issue costs, the differences have the expected sign, two of which are statistically significant. Overall, our univariate analyses as 22 reported in Table 3 support our hypotheses: firms with better governance quality are more likely to conduct shelf or accelerated offers, and they also enjoy lower issue costs.
Regression Results
In this subsection, we investigate the relation between equity offer methods, issue costs, and certification mechanisms controlling for firm and issue characteristics that may affect issue methods. First, we examine the determinants of equity offer method by running the following panel logit regressions: 
The dependent variables are shelf and accelerated which are dummy variables that take the value of one if an issue is shelf registered or accelerated offer, respectively, and zero otherwise. Firm size is measured as the natural logarithm of net sales in thousands of US dollars at the last financial year end before an offering 17 . ROA is earnings before interest and taxes scaled by total assets at the fiscal year end before an equity offering. Growth is the growth rate of net sales during the year of the equity offering. Leverage is total long-term debt divided by total assets at the financial year end before an equity offering. Issue size is the natural logarithm of the offer proceeds in thousands of US dollars. Primary is the proportion of primary shares in the total shares offered. Nasdaq is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm is listed on Nasdaq and zero otherwise. The internal certification proxies included are each of the four governance component ratings and the overall governance quality ranking. We use audit fee as an external certification proxy. In order to ensure that our results are not distorted by outliers, we winsorize all variables 17 We also used alternate proxies for firm size such as total assets and market capitalization.
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except for the dummies at the 1 st and the 99 th percentiles. We also estimate the standard errors through bootstrapping using 200 replications. Table 4 presents the panel logit regression results for the determinants of shelf-registered offerings. Our focus is on the relation between shelf offerings and certification mechanisms such as internal governance quality. We find that all the governance quality ratings except for G2
(anti-takeover) are significantly positively related to the likelihood of a shelf offering. This is consistent with the univariate results in Table 3 and supports our first hypothesis (H1), that is, firms with better internal governance quality are more likely to use shelf-registered offerings when conducting SEOs. Audit fee, our proxy for external certification, is highly positively associated with the choice of using shelf registration. We also find that firms with higher financial leverage and offerings which include a higher proportion of primary shares are more likely to use shelf registered offerings. This indicates that firms utilizing shelf offerings are those facing tighter financial conditions and having a greater need for external financing (Heron and Lie, 2004) . In addition, Nasdaq firms tend to use shelf offerings less often. To the extent that Nasdaq firms are typically of higher risk and potentially more difficult to value, this finding suggests that firms for whom certification by underwriters is more important rely less on shelf offerings. We also find that larger firms are more likely to use shelf offerings. There is a negative relationship between issue size and the choice of shelf registration. Firms raising higher proceeds tend not to use shelf registration.
Results from panel logit regression analyses of the determinants of accelerated offerings are reported in Table 5 . The probability of conducting an accelerated offer increases with a firm's governance quality, which is evidenced by the positive and significant coefficient estimates for all governance ratings except G2. Audit fee, the external certification proxy, is 24 significantly positively associated with the choice of accelerated offerings in four of the six models used. This supports our second hypothesis (H2). We also find that larger firms are more likely to use accelerated offering, which is consistent with Gao and Ritter (2010) . Firms with higher return on assets (ROA) are less likely to use accelerated offerings. The negative relationship between ROA and the decision to use accelerated offering method is consistent with the recommendation of Myers and Majluf (1984) who suggest that firms should build up a slack when conditions are favourable. The positive coefficient estimate for leverage suggests that a firm's preference for an accelerated offering may be driven by its tight financial situation. We also find that firms raising a larger amount of capital or listed on Nasdaq are less likely to use accelerated offering. This is in line with the finding of Gao and Ritter (2010), as the marketing service provided by underwriters during a traditional bookbuilt offer is more valuable for such firms, they tend to use accelerated offerings less often.
In order to perform rigorous tests for the potential impact of certification quality on gross spreads we need to control for the possibility of self-selection bias. Firms which self-select the accelerated offerings methods for SEOs may have intrinsic qualities that may also affect the gross spread. Li and Prabhala (2005) describe in detail the self-selection models commonly used in corporate finance and provide the rationale for using them. Following Lee and Masulis (2009) and Bethel and Krigman (2008) , we examine the determinants of gross spreads paid by estimating a Heckman two-stage model to control for the potential selection bias implicit in firms choosing the accelerated method. The first stage logit estimation uses Model 5 of 
We control for firm size, ROA, leverage, growth and primary offerings. Finally, we include lambda, the inverse mills ratio calculated by the first stage logit model, which is the predicted probability that a firm uses accelerated method.
Our results are shown in Table 6 . We find that after controlling for self-selection, that a firm's internal corporate governance has a weak effect on gross spread. However, audit fee, our external certification variable, has a significant negative effect on gross spread. The panel regression results show that firms which are more profitable enjoy significantly lower issue costs. We also find that firms that sell a higher proportion of primary shares bear higher issue costs, which may be because they require more marketing efforts from the underwriters. Our empirical results support our third hypothesis (H3). We find that lambda has a reliable positive impact on gross spread. This finding implies that the decision to select accelerate offerings method has a positive impact on gross spread after controlling for the self-selection problem.
We investigate the determinants of net proceeds by estimating a Heckman two-stage model to control for the potential selection bias implicit in firms choosing the accelerated method. The first stage logit estimation uses Model 5 of 
Our empirical results, which are reported in Table 7 , indicate strong empirical support for a positive relation between external certification and issue size. Audit fee is strongly positively 26 associated with net proceeds. Thus firms which face a smaller adverse selection risk are able to make larger size SEO issues. Internal certification mechanism as proxied by good quality corporate governance has a weak effect on net proceeds. Firms which have higher ROA are able to raise more issue proceeds consistent with the view that the market and investment bankers are less concerned about the misuse of free cash flows when firms have a good track record of profitability. Market capitalization has a significant positive impact on net proceeds implying that large firms suffer less from information asymmetry and are therefore able to raise more money from SEOs. The coefficient of lambda is positive and significant at the one per cent level indicating that even after controlling for firm characteristics that drive the choice of accelerated offerings, firms using accelerated offerings raise higher proceeds than firms using nonaccelerated methods. Our empirical evidence supports our fourth hypothesis (H4).
Overall, our results show that both internal and certification devices play a role in affecting key aspects of a firm's SEO issuance. Both certification methods (internal and external) influence the choice of registration method (shelf versus non-shelf) and issuance method (accelerated versus non-accelerated). However, only the external certification device (audit fee) is associated significantly with flotation costs and issue size. This evidence suggests that investment bankers lend greater credibility to external certification provided by audit fee in setting their gross spread and issue size.
Robustness Checks
We check the robustness of our empirical findings in two ways. First, we use alternate proxies for certification. For internal certification, we use Industry CGQ as an alternate proxy. Tables 4 through 7 show that we get qualitatively similar results in issuance choice, issuance cost and issuance size models. As an alternate proxy for external certification (the certification by potential investors), we compare the file offer price with the initial offer price range and use two dummy variables, below range and above range, to capture the situations where the final offer price is below or above the initial range, respectively.
Our results reported in
Because the difference between the final offer price and the initial price range reflects the deviation of the potential investors' assessment of the equity offering from the issuer's own assessment, we argue that the larger the difference is, the weaker is the certification from potential investors. Our empirical evidence supports the validity of this alternate certification proxy in issuance choice models reported in Tables 4 and 5 .
Second, we use alternate proxies for firm size. We use net sales, total assets, and market capitalization to proxy for size in our tests. Our empirical results are qualitatively similar. We do not tabulate these results in order to conserve space.
Conclusions
Recent work has documented the increased use of accelerated offers in SEOs in the US.
For issuers, the reduction in time taken to issue and the lower issuance costs in the accelerated offers method compared to fully marketed offers are attractive features. However, the issuance of new capital via SEOs is fraught with the information asymmetry problem between issuers and investors. Underwriters typically use due diligence to reduce information asymmetry in order to sell the issue to potential investors. The reduction in issuance time in accelerated offers affects the conduct of due diligence. How do high quality issuers differentiate themselves from low quality issuers in order to issue equity via accelerated offers?
We contribute to the emerging literature by examining this crucial issue. Given the fact that firms have been paying increasing attention to corporate governance over the last two decades, we hypothesize that internal corporate governance may serve as a certification device 28 and allow issuers with strong governance to overcome the under certification problem and take advantage of shelf and accelerated offerings. We also posit that an external certification mechanism such as the audit fee paid by the firm may provide a credible means of overcoming the under certification problem in the context of SEO issuance.We postulate that firms may use internal and external certification mechanisms to signal lower asymmetry.
Our empirical results confirm our conjecture and indicate that firms with higher certification quality are more likely to use the accelerated offers method while issuing SEOs.
Using a panel dataset of US SEOs, we find evidence suggesting that these internal and external certification mechanisms perform three significant roles in the issuance of SEOs. First, by reducing information asymmetry, certification mechanisms influence the choice between accelerated offerings and fully marketed offers. Second, we find that certification mechanisms help to reduce the issuance costs as measured by gross spread. Finally, we find that there exists an association between the efficacy of certification and the net proceeds of SEO issuance. Our paper contributes to the securities issuance and corporate governance literature by proposing a linkage between governance quality and the choice of securities issue techniques and providing empirical evidence that supports the existence of the linkage. Shelf is a dummy variable that equals one if an equity offer is a shelf-registered offering and zero otherwise. Accelerated is a dummy variable that equals one if an equity offer is an accelerated offer and zero otherwise. Spread is the gross spread as a percentage of the principal amount offered. G1, G2, G3, and G4 are ratings of governance quality concerning board of directors, anti-takeover provisions, executive and director ownership and compensation, and audit practices and other progressive practices, respectively. CGI4 is the sum of G1, G2, G3, and G4. These ratings are compiled by ourselves using raw data provided by RiskMetrics. IndustryCGQ which is compiled by RiskMetrics, is the percentile rankings of the governance quality for a firm vis-à-vis its industry group. Higher governance rankings indicate better governance quality. Firm size is measured by net sales at the last financial year end before an equity offering in thousands of US dollars. ROA is earnings before interest and taxes scaled by total assets at the last financial year end before an equity offering. Growth is the growth rate of net sales during the year of the equity offering. Leverage is total long-term debt divided by total assets at the last financial year end before an equity offering. Issue size is the offering proceeds in thousands of US dollars. Primary is the proportion of primary shares in the total shares offered. Nasdaq is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm is listed on Nasdaq and zero otherwise. (0.015) Firm-years are assigned to quintiles based on their CGI4 ratings. Panel A presents the mean value for issuance variables (shelf, accelerated, spread, issue size, and primary) and firm characteristics (firm size and Nasdaq) for each quintile, and the median of ROA, Growth, and Leverage for each quintile. Panel B tests the difference in mean shelf, accelerated, spread, and firm size between consecutive quintiles. For shelf and accelerated, one-sided proportion tests are used. For spread and firm size, one-sided t-tests are used. All variables are as defined in Table 1 . Numbers in the brackets are the p-values. One, two, and three asterisks indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The sample period is 2001 to 2007. The dependent variable is accelerated. Market Cap is the Market Capitalization in US dollars at the last financial year end before an offering. The coefficients of market cap are multiplied by 10 -7 for convenience. Issue size is the natural logarithm of total proceeds in US dollars. Below range and above range are dummy variables that equal one if the issue price is below or above the filing price range, respectively, and zero otherwise. Audit fee is the natural logarithm of a firm's three-year average total audit fee in US dollars as of the financial year end before an offering. All the other variables are as defined in Table 1 . All variables except for the dummy variables are winsorized at the 1 st and the 99 th percentiles. Numbers in the brackets are the p-values. Standard errors are based on the bootstrapping method using 500 replications. One, two, and three asterisks indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The sample period is 2001 to 2007. The dependent variable is spread. Market cap is in thousands of US dollars and is measured at the financial year end before an offering. The coefficients of market cap are multiplied by 10 -7 for convenience. Audit fee is the natural logarithm of a firm's three-year average total audit fee in US dollars as of the financial year end before an offering. All the other variables are as defined in Table 1 . All variables except for the dummy variables are winsorized at the 1 st and the 99 th percentiles. Numbers in the brackets are the p-values. Standard errors are based on the bootstrapping method using 500 replications. One, two, and three asterisks indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The sample period is 2001 to 2007. The dependent variable is net proceeds. Market cap is in thousands of US dollars and is measured at the financial year end before an offering. The coefficients of market cap are multiplied by 10 -7 for convenience. Audit fee is the natural logarithm of a firm's three-year average total audit fee in US dollars as of the financial year end before an offering. All the other variables are as defined in Table 1 . All variables except for the dummy variables are winsorized at the 1 st and the 99 th percentiles. Numbers in the brackets are the p-values. . Standard errors are based on the bootstrapping method using 500 replications. One, two, and three asterisks indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
